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NOTE
NOT QUITE FOUCAULT'S PENDULUM: AN
ANALYSIS OF GRUNTZ AND BANKRUPTCY
COURT JURISDICTION OVER THE AUTOMATIC
STAY
I. INTRODUCTION
As strange as it sounds, the only fixed point in the universe is a
twenty-eight kilogram "silver ball with a needle point," that swings from
a sixty-seven meter wire attached to the ceiling of the Conservatoire des
Arts et Mtiers in Paris, France: the famed Foucault's pendulum.' Jean
Bernard Leon Foucault, the pendulum's inventor, designed it as a means
2to demonstrate the Earth's rotation. It swings, perpetually, deriving its
momentum from the movements of the Earth and the universe.3 "The
pendulum, privileged, looms over the lunacy, scorn, and fear of the
world because [its] point of attachment, alone in the universe, is fixed-
wherever you choose to put it.
" 4
Bankruptcy courts, with their exclusive jurisdiction over the
bankrupt debtor's estate,5 are a fixed point in the universe of parties
interested in the debtor's assets. In this way they resemble Foucault's
pendulum: "the only stable point in the cosmos." 6 Yet, in many ways,
bankruptcy courts are not the sole fixed point in the bankruptcy
universe. In certain instances, that universe revolves around other fixed
points. One such example concerns the automatic stay and its
1. Geoffrey Sauer, Foucault's Pendulum: Eco's Second Detective Thriller (Feb. 12, 1990)
(available at <http://eserver.org/home/geoff/cv/pendulum.html>) (accessed Nov. 16,




5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West 2001). Subsection (a) of the statute gives district courts
exclusive and original jurisdiction for bankruptcy cases. Id. However, subsection (b) gives
district courts "original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under
title 11 or arising to or related to a case under title 11" notwithstanding an act of Congress.
Id.
6. Sauer, supran. 1.
1
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applicability to criminal actions brought against a debtor.
Congress clearly states, in section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, that
the automatic stay does not protect a debtor from "the commencement
or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding."7 What is less clear is
whether state courts have jurisdiction to determine the applicability of
the automatic stay, or if that job is solely within the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts. Whether applicability jurisdiction is shared or not,
courts have wrestled with whether the stay should apply in situations
where the state's main purpose in prosecuting, sentencing or revoking
the probation of the debtor, is to collect a debt. s
These situations arise most often in the context of domestic law
when the state prosecutes a "dead-beat" dad for failure to pay child-
support. 9 When the state uses the threat of imprisonment to force a
debtor to meet the dependent support payment terms imposed by a
divorce decree, the state appears to promote both civil and criminal goals
by acting on both the child's and its citizen's behalves. If the debtor files
for bankruptcy after the state successfully prosecutes the "dead beat"
debtor and the court sentences the debtor to make good on his child
support obligations as a condition of probation, the powers of the
bankruptcy court and those of the state court come into direct conflict.
Does the "plenary power" exercised by the bankruptcy court over the
debtor's estate extend so far as to prevent states from enforcing
monetary obligations arising under state law against the debtor?. Or
should the state's sovereign interest in protecting its citizens against
criminals allow it to modify or to override the bankruptcy court's
protective powers? A recent en banc decision by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, In re Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles,10 offered answers to
these questions.
This Note seeks to examine the Gruntz decision in order to assess
the soundness of its holding, and if necessary, to offer recommendations
on the course the law should take. To this end, the Note will analyze
Gruntz in light of its facts, the relevant statutory provisions, and the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code pertaining to the automatic stay,
along with recent Supreme Court precedent, case law from other
circuits, and the opinions of some scholars and practitioners. Because
the Bankruptcy Code's language and congressional intent are both clear,
and because the current approach taken by the Supreme Court favors
7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(1) (West 2001).
8. See e.g. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); In re Rollins, 200 B.R.
427 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
9. See e.g. In re Rollins, 200 B.R 427 (N.D. Ga. 1996), rev'd, 243 B.R. 540 (N.D. Ga.
1997), affd, Campbell v. Rollins, 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1998) (involving a father who
owed child support payments).
10. 202 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000).
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looking principally at these factors, the best reading of section 36211 is
that the automatic stay does not reach any criminal proceeding brought
against a debtor, regardless of prosecutorial motive. Thus, courts who
attempt to read too much into prosecutorial intent by searching for a
debt collection motive, are probably not correctly interpreting the reach
of the automatic stay.
With respect to which sovereign, state or federal, has jurisdiction to
determine the applicability of the automatic stay, the most logical
interpretation of jurisdictional statutes and case law suggests that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts to make that
determination. Where state courts mistakenly conclude the automatic
stay does not apply, however, their determinations will not have
preclusive effect in bankruptcy courts.
I. GRumNz-A SEA CHANGE IN NINTH CIRCUIT LAW
Until the Gruntz decision in February of 2000, the Ninth Circuit
followed the rule articulated in Hucke v. Oregon12 in delimiting the reach
of the automatic stay in cases where a criminal defendant seeks the
protection of the bankruptcy court to enjoin prosecution, sentencing, or
probationary revocation in state court. Gruntz overturned the court's
holding in Hucke that criminal prosecutions that have an underlying
purpose of debt collection fall within the reach of the automatic stay.'
3
Before discussing the Gruntz decision, it is worthwhile to examine Hucke
and how the Ninth Circuit reached its decision in that case.
A. Background: The Ninth Circuit's Holding in Hucke and How it Got
There
In Hucke, the Ninth Circuit held that state criminal proceedings,
which have debt collection as their primary objective, are not excepted
from the automatic stay.' 4 The debtor in Hucke was sentenced to five
years probation after he pled guilty to rape in state court.'5 Per the
terms of his probation, the court ordered the debtor to pay over $21,000
in compensatory fines and restitution, at the rate of $500 per month. 6
Before he made any payments, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 2001).
12. 992 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 862 (1993).
13. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1085-87. Although the court in Hucke reached the same result
on the merits as the Gruntz court (that the criminal court action against the debtor was
excepted from the reach of the automatic stay), it did so because it found that the state
court judge's action, in revoking the debtor's probation, did not have debt collection as its
aim. Cf. Hucke, 992 F.2d at 953.
14. Hucke, 992 F.2d at 953.
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petition, listing the criminal fines as one of his debts. 17 Under the terms
of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, he was to pay his creditors just over
$200 per month.' 8 Because the state claimed Hucke violated his
probation terms, the state petitioned for revocation.' 9 When the debtor's
attorney failed to convince the judge to allow the debtor to modify his
Chapter 13 plan in order to pay the state most of what he owed, the
judge revoked the debtor's probation and sentenced him to three years
in prison. 20 After filing an amended plan calling for monthly payment of
nearly one-hundred percent of the amount owed under the terms of his
probation, the debtor filed an adversary proceeding alleging that the
state probation revocation proceeding was void as violating the
21
automatic stay.
The bankruptcy court granted Hucke's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the probation revocation proceeding was aimed
at debt collection because it arose out of the debtor's failure to pay the
fine.22 The district court affirmed and ordered the debtor released from
23prison.
In reviewing the lower courts' rulings, the Ninth Circuit first
examined the various situations under which the automatic stay
applied.24 It then looked at the exception under section 362(b)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code for "the commencement or continuation of a criminal
action or proceeding against a debtor."25 Although the court recognized
a "probation revocation proceeding, without more, would constitute a
continuation of a criminal action against the [debtor]," it noted that "if
the probation hearing had as its aim the collection of the fine, then it
would run afoul of [section] 362(a)(6),26 which stays acts intended to
'collect, assess or recover a claim' against the debtor."27 The court noted,




20. Hucke, 992 F.2d at 951.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing In re Hucke, 127 B.R. 258, 262 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991), habeas corpus, 128
B.R. 675 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991), vacated, 992 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1993).
23. Id. (citing Hucke, 128 B.R. at 677).
24. See id. at 953 (discussing 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 2001)).
25. Id. at 953 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(1) (West 2001)).
26. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (a)(6) (West 2001) states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title... operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of-
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
Id.
27. Hucke, 992 F.2d at 953 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(6) (West 2001)).
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proceeding, it would be exempt from the stay under section 362(b)(1). 28
Turning to the facts, the court found the state judge acted to revoke the
debtor's probation because the judge felt the purposes of the probation
were not being served, not because the debtor violated the conditions of
his probation. 29 Therefore, the Hucke court reasoned the state judge did
not intend the revocation as a means of forcing the debtor to comply
with the terms of his probation.3 ° Thus, the court held that the judge's
decision did not have debt collection as its aim, and therefore, did not
violate the automatic stay.3 1
The court next addressed the debtor's argument that the Supreme
Court's holding in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v.
Davenpor 2 that simultaneously allowing criminal prosecutions while
precluding restitution order enforcement proceedings during bankruptcy
was not inconsistent with policy.33 Pointing to key factual differences in
the case, the court distinguished Davenport, ultimately concluding that
the state court did not violate the automatic stay and was within its
bounds to revoke the debtor's probation.-4
B. Gruntz: Jurisdictional Questions Answered and Hucke Overruled
In Gruntz the Ninth Circuit held that state court modifications of
the automatic stay are not binding on federal courts, but the automatic
stay does not act to enjoin criminal prosecutions brought by states.3 5
The debtor in Gruntz was ordered to pay $300 per month in child
36
support, which he failed to do. In the wake of his failure to make the
28. Id.
29. Id. at 953-54. The court noted that "Judge Haas stressed that Hucke's rehabilitation
could only be demonstrated by remorsefulness and a sense of responsibility, [and that he]
believed that in attempting to avoid paying restitution by filing for Chapter 13 relief, Hucke
demonstrated a callous disregard for the victim and a disrespect for the court and the
judicial system." Id. at 954. The court also pointed to the fact that Judge Haas' judgment
did not impose a monetary obligation on Hucke (the payment plan proposed by the debtor
was rejected) as further evidence of the judge's intent. Cf. Hucke, 128 B.R. at 675-78
(choosing not to focus on Judge Haas' intent, the district court instead considered the
reason the revocation proceeding was initiated (i.e. because the debtor failed to meet the
terms of his probation)). The district court also noted the Supreme Court's holding in
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport that the automatic stay
"preclude[s] probation officials from enforcing restitution orders while a debtor seeks relief
under Chapter 13" as justification for its holding that the state's action violated the
automatic stay, thus finding the state court probation revocation judgment void. Id. at 679
(quoting Pa. Dept of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport. 495 U.S. 552, 560-61 (1990)).
30. Hucke, 992 F.2d at 954.
31. Id.
32. 495 U.S. 552, 560-61 (1990).
33. Hucke, 992 F.2d at 954 (quoting Davenport, 495 U.S. at 560-61).
34. Id. The court pointed out that Davenport dealt with a state court that refused to
obey a bankruptcy court order including the restitution obligation in the tally of a Chapter
13 debtor's debts, while the state court in Hucke did not attempt to collect the restitution
debt from the debtor at all, once it decided to revoke the debtor's probation. Id.
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required payments, he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. Per
the terms of his confirmed plan, Gruntz was required to pay a total of
$591 per month, including the required monthly amount and a portion
of back payments owed. 38 Before any of the payments made to the
trustee were disbursed, Gruntz' case was converted to a Chapter 11.3
9
Gruntz' ex-wife then filed criminal charges with the Los Angeles County
District Attorney; and as a result, he was convicted for failing to support
his dependent children.40  Gruntz tried to prevent the state from
sentencing him by asking the bankruptcy court to issue an injunction
against the State of California.41 The request was refused, and Gruntz
was tried and convicted for two other related offenses.42 The present
case arose when he filed an adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court
asking that all the criminal proceedings brought against him by the
State of California be declared void for violating the automatic stay.43
The bankruptcy court ruled that the complaint was collaterally
estopped by the state court judgments and dismissed it.44 The district
court affirmed the judgment on Rooker-Feldman doctrine grounds. 45 A
three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, prompting the request
for rehearing en banc.46
The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the three judge panel in favor of the
original ruling by the bankruptcy court, first examined the right of state
courts to amend or modify the automatic stay.47 After examining the
principles of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the constitutional and
statutory grants of jurisdictional authority applicable to federal courts,
and federalism, the court concluded that construing the reach of the
automatic stay in bankruptcy is solely within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.48 Thus, it found state courts lack the power to amend or
to modify the automatic stay.49 The court then turned to whether the
automatic stay applied to the state criminal prosecution against
37. Id. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1330 (West 2001), permits a debtor with regular income to
make regular payments on the debt, through the bankruptcy trustee as stated in the title
of Chapter 13 "Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income." Id






44. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1077.
45. Id. at 1077-78.
46. Id. at 1078 (citing In re Gruntz v. County of L.A., 177 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 1999),
withdrawn, 202 F.3d 1074 (2000)).
47. Id- at 1078.
48. Id. at 1084. See infra nn. 54-61 and accompanying text for discussion of the Gruntz
court's consideration of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the constitutional and statutory
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Gruntz.5 0  The court concluded that the plain language of section
362(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code made it clear that criminal
prosecutions against the debtor were exempt from the protections of the
automatic stay.5 1 In its holding, the Ninth Circuit expressly overruled
the notion, proclaimed by the Hucke court, that section 362(a)(6)
operates to trump the section 362(b)(1) exclusion if "a criminal
proceeding has the collection of a debt as its underlying aim."5 2 The
court also noted that its holding in Gruntz was in consonance with the
positions taken by other circuits.
5 3
1. The Question of Jurisdiction over the Automatic Stay
In answering the jurisdictional question, the Gruntz court began by
examining the various sources of jurisdictional authority. It first
examined the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.F The court
noted that Rooker-Feldman is just one of several sources of jurisdictional
law which could bear on the case. 55 The other two-habeas corpus law
and bankruptcy law-allow federal district courts to act in ways Rooker-
Feldman would not otherwise permit.5 6  With regard to bankruptcy
jurisdiction, the court listed several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
which allow bankruptcy courts to avoid state court judgments, 57 and
noted the established rule that "[a] state court judgment entered in a
case that falls within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction is subject
to collateral attack in the federal courts."5 8 The court went on to note
the exclusive role the Constitution vests in Congress in regulating
bankruptcy, 9 and how Congress has used that power to vest jurisdiction
over bankruptcy in the federal district courts. 60 The court then offered
the bankruptcy jurisdictional statute as proof that power over
bankruptcy matters is within the exclusive province of the federal
50. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at1084.
51. IL at 1085.
52. Id. (citing Hucke, 992 F.2d at 953). See supra n. 26 for the language of 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 362(a)(6) (West 2001).
53. Id. The court noted that other circuits had not followed the Hucke doctrine. Id.
54. Id. at 1087-88. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two Supreme
Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Ct. of App. v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In simple terms the doctrine stands for the proposition
that the Supreme Court alone, among the federal courts, has the power to hear appeals
from state court decisions. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16. The other federal courts are also
barred from entertaining claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with claims already
decided by state courts. Feldian, 460 U.S. at 486-87.
55. Id. at 1079.
56. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1079.
57. Id. (listing sections of the Bankruptcy Code pertaining to avoidance, modification,
and dischargeability).
58. Id. (quoting In re Gonzales, 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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district courts. 61
Next, the court discussed the role of bankruptcy courts. The court
first revealed the process by which federal district courts automatically
refer all Bankruptcy Code cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy
62
courts. The court then explained the distinction between core and
non-core proceedings,63 and Congress' declaration that actions to
"terminate, annul or modify" the automatic stay are core proceedings.'
The purpose of the automatic stay, according to the court, is to give "the
bankruptcy court an opportunity to harmonize the interests of both
debtor and creditors while preserving the debtor's assets for repayment
and reorganization of his or her obligations."65 The court then described
the nature of automatic stay as being a type of injunction, noting in
particular the reach of the automatic stay under section 362(a)(6).66
According to the court, the powers the bankruptcy court exercises under
67the automatic stay are not subject to state court modification, and
further, "actions in violation of the automatic stay are void. " 68 In
addition, the court noted, "[a] congressional grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal courts includes the implied power to protect
that grant." 6 9 The court further recognized that because "federal courts
have the final authority to determine the scope and applicability of the
automatic stay,"70 state courts do not have the authority to "violate the
supreme law of the land."7 1 Thus, the court reasoned, Rooker-Feldman
does not apply to bankruptcy because a bankruptcy court enforcing the
automatic stay does not "conduct an improper review of a state court."7 2
Ultimately, the Gruntz court concluded that states cannot modify or
amend the automatic stay and that Rooker-Feldman does not deny
federal courts the right to enforce the automatic stay, or to hear appeals
like the case at issue. 3
61. Id. at 1080 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West 2001)), which states that "[d]istrict
courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11").
62. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1080 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(a) (West 2001)). Section 157(a)
gives district courts the discretion to refer cases arising under Title 11 to the bankruptcy
courts. Id. at 1080 n. 4. The court also notes that it is uniform practice for the district
courts to automatically refer cases to the bankruptcy courts by way of local rules. Id.
63. Id. at 1081 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 2001)).
64. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(G) (West 2001)).
65. Id. (quoting In re MacDonald, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985)).
66. Id. at 1081-82 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(6) (West 2001)).
67. Id. at 1082 (citing Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964) in support
of the proposition that state courts are powerless to restrain federal in rem proceedings
under the Bankruptcy Code).
68. Gruntz, 202 B.R. at 1082 (citing In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992)).
69. Id. at 1083 (quoting Gonzales, 830 F.2d at 1036).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1084.
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2. The Applicability of the Automatic Stay to the Commencement
or Continuation of Criminal Proceedings in State Court
After reaching its conclusion on the first issue, the Gruntz court
took up the issue of whether the automatic stay applies to criminal court
proceedings brought against the debtor in state court.7 4 After stating the
general policy set forth by the Supreme Court in Kelly v. Robinson7 5 that
"federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state
criminal proceedings,"7 6 the court examined the language of section
362(b)(1).77
Section 362(b)(1), the court noted, provides that "[tihe filing of a
petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... does not operate
as a stay-(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement
or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor."78
Although the court recognized that the plain language of the statute
suggests the automatic stay would not operate to enjoin the criminal
proceedings brought against Gruntz, e the court noted that its holding in
Hucke may require it to examine the motives of the state in prosecuting
the debtor.8 0 Noting the difficulty of divining the motives for prosecution,
the fact that the Hucke holding is no longer consistent with other
circuits' positions on the issue8 l and the absence, in section 362(b)(1), of
any language "provid[ing] any exception for prosecutorial purpose or bad
faith[,]" the court concluded that section 362(b)(1) should be "enforced
according to its terms."8 2
In further support of its position, the court listed factors that
74. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1084.
75. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
76. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1084 (quoting Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47). In Kelly, the Supreme
Court overturned a decision by the Second Circuit that held criminal restitution
obligations qualified under the definition of debt and thus were subject to discharge in
Chapter 7 proceedings. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 36. Even though the Court did not specifically
address criminal proceedings with regard to the automatic stay, the decision does indicate
the Court's preference for a reading of the Bankruptcy Code that gives states wide latitude
in defining and adjudicating criminal matters. See id. (emphasizing that bankruptcy
courts should not "invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings"). The Second
Circuit's holding in Kelly has been widely criticized. See e.g. Siobhan E. Moran, Student
Author, The Second Circuit's Novel Approach to Defining Debt Under the Bankruptcy Code:
In Re Robinson, 60 St. John's L. Rev. 344 (1986); Seamus C. Duffy, Student Author,
Bankruptcy: Dischargeability of Restitutive Conditions of Probation-Criminals Find Refuge
in the Provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 31 Vill. L. Rev. 591 (1986).
77. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1085.
78. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(1) (West 2001)).
79. See id. at 1084-85 (discussing the plain language of the statute which clearly states
that the Code does not stay a criminal proceeding against a debtor).
80. See id. (citing Hucke, 992 F.2d at 953 which requires courts to look at the
underlying aim" of the proceeding).
81. Id. at 1085.
82. Id. (citing U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)). Ron Pair
Enterprises is one case in a long line of decisions by the Rhenquist Court that says courts
should interpret provisions of the Bankruptcy Code according to their "plain meaning."
Ron Pair, 489 U.S. 242. For a fuller discussion, see infra n. 92.
20011 615
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suggest the bankruptcy court's power over the debtor's estate does not
extend to state criminal proceedings. First, the court offered that "[tihe
purpose of bankruptcy is to protect those in financial, not moral,
difficulty."83  The court pointed to the fact that "actions brought
pursuant to a government's police power" are not subject to removal to
bankruptcy courts as evidence of this." Next, the court noted that
"Congress has specifically subordinated the goals of economic
rehabilitation and equitable distribution of assets to the states' interest
in prosecuting criminals. "5 The court went on to add that it is up to the
judgment of the state to determine what is and is not criminal, and that
prosecutions are brought on behalf of all citizens. 86 The court added
further that trying a criminal case is up to the discretion of the
prosecutor, which is "ill-suited to judicial review. "37
The court concluded by holding that the automatic stay did not
reach California's prosecutions of Gruntz.38 It also noted that Gruntz
89had other remedies to pursue like habeas corpus, or an injunction
under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. 90
III. ANALYSIS: Is GRuTz=THE RIGHT ANSWER?
As the Ninth Circuit indicated, the Gruntz decision is consistent
with the approach other circuits have taken with respect to construing
the reach of the automatic stay.91 The remainder of this Note will briefly
survey the prevailing trends in the Supreme Court and the other
circuits, and discuss some troubling aspects of the jurisdictional portion
of the opinion. In the final tally, this analysis will show that Gruntz does
propound a solid solution that is true to both law and policy on the issue
of whether certain state actions against a debtor violate the automatic
stay. With respect to whether only bankruptcy courts can determine the
applicability of the automatic stay, however, Gruntz is problematic.
A. "No Means No:" An Overview of Recent Holdings by the Supreme
Court and the Circuits
Although the Supreme Court has never directly answered whether
the automatic stay operates to enjoin criminal proceedings brought for
the main purpose of debt collection, Gruntz appears to be consistent
83. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1085. (quoting Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d 1250, 1251 (11th
Cir. 1982)).
84. Id- (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1452 (West 2001)).
85. Id. at 1086.
86. Id.
87. Id (quoting Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
88. Id. at 1088.
89. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1086 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2242 (West 2001)).
90. Id at 1087 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West 2001)).
91. Id. at 1085.
616 [Vol. 37:607
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with recent Supreme Court precedent in two ways. First, the Gruntz
holding fits neatly within the "plain meaning" approach taken by the
Rhenquist Court in resolving other questions pertaining to provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. 92 Second, the Court has indicated its preference
in Kelly, that "bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of
state criminal proceedings." 93 Yet, some courts have used the Supreme
Court's holding in Davenport for the proposition that criminal
proceedings, whose underlying purpose is debt collection, are subject to
the automatic stay.94 Because these two opinions95 appear inconsistent,
and for other reasons addressed herein, it is possible to read the
Supreme Court as supporting the notion that prosecutions might fall
within the automatic stay. However, a closer look reveals that these
inconsistencies are merely cosmetic. In reality, the Court has continued
to follow its "plain meaning" standard.9 6
In Kelly, the Supreme Court considered whether criminal
restitution obligations were debts dischargeable in Chapter 7
bankruptcy.9 7 The debtor in Kelly was ordered to make restitution after
her conviction for fraudulently receiving welfare benefits.98 Shortly
thereafter, she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, in which she
listed the restitution obligation as a claim.99 All her debts were
eventually discharged; nevertheless, the state attempted enforcing the
restitutionary obligation. 1° The debtor objected, arguing the
restitutionary obligations were debts that had been discharged. 0 1 The
bankruptcy court found the restitution payments were non-
92. See Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rhenquist Courts Evolving
"Plain Meaning" Approach to Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1636 (1993).
In his article, Mr. Effross reviewed several of the seminal bankruptcy decisions handed
down by the Rhenquist Court concluding that the Court will interpret Bankruptcy Code
provisions by their plain meanings "[sbo long as the plain meaning is coherent and
consistent with the remainder of the Code and with other statutes, the section's legislative
history will generally be deemed irrelevant." Id. at 1638-39. He added, however, that
where this meaning is ambiguous the Court will consider the Code provision's legislative
history. Id. at 1039.
93. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47.
94. Hucke, 128 B.R. at 679. The district court quoted language in Davenport that the
automatic stay "preclude[s] probation officials from enforcing restitution orders while a
debtor seeks relief under Chapter 13" in support of its holding that the state, in revoking
the debtor's probation for failing to make restitutionary payments, violated the automatic
stay. Id. (quoting Davenport, 495 U.S. at 561).
95. It is worth noting that both Kelly and Davenport addressed the dischargeability of
criminal restitutionary obligations; however, neither decision addressed any automatic stay
Issues. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 39; Davenport, 495 U.S. at 553 (discussing dischargeability
of criminal restitutionary obligations).
96. See supra n. 92 and accompanying text.
97. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 38.
98. Id. at 38.
99. Id. at 39.
100. Id. at 39-40.
101. Id. at 40.
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dischargeable debts, 1 0 2 but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the
restitution payments were discharged. 1
03
The Supreme Court reversed, °4 holding that section 523(a)(7) 10
5
"preserves from discharge any condition a state criminal court imposes
as part of a criminal sentence," but the Court avoided determining
whether those obligations were debts. 10 6 Even though Kelly considered
only issues regarding dischargeability of debts, the decision has been
used to support the proposition that criminal proceedings, no matter
what their underlying aim, are exempt from the reach of the automatic
stay. 107
In the Davenport case, the Supreme Court again considered
whether restitutionary obligations were dischargeable, but in the context
of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. °8 Like the debtor in Kelly, the Davenport
debtors were convicted of welfare fraud, and were ordered to make
restitution in lieu of going to prison.1°9 The debtors subsequently filed
for bankruptcy under Chapter 13.110 The county probation department
responded by initiating revocation proceedings, which the debtors
attempted to block with an adversary proceeding."' The debtors'
probation was not revoked, but the state court ordered the restitutionary
obligation to remain in effect.1 2 The bankruptcy court held that the
restitution was dischargeable. "13 The district court reversed, and the
Third Circuit reversed the district court. 14
In affinming the Third Circuit, the Davenport Court did what the
Kelly Court did not by holding that restitutionary obligations are debts,
which are dischargeable under Chapter 13.115 The Court recognized it
reached the opposite result in Kelly, but noted that in drafting Chapter
13, "Congress secured a broader discharge for debtors under Chapter 13
than Chapter 7 by extending to Chapter 13 proceedings some, but not
all, of [section] 523(a)'s exceptions to discharge."" 6  The court also
102. Id. at 41.
103. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 42.
104. I& at 43.
105. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(7) (West 2001). Section 523(a)(7) excepts from discharge any
debt which is "a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental
unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." Id.
106. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50.
107. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1084; U.S. v. Caddell, 830 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1987).
108. Davenport, 495 U.S. at 555.
109. Id. at 556.
110. Id.
111. Id. at557.
112. Id. at 555.
113. Id.
114. Davenport, 495 U.S. at 557.
115. Id. at 555.
116. Id. at 563 (citing Lawrence King, Collier on Bankruptcy vol. 5, l 1328.0111][c] (15th
ed., Matthew Bender 1986)).
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addressed the United State's amicus argument that allowing criminal
restitution obligations to be discharged was inconsistent with section
362(b)(1)'s exception to the automatic stay for "commencement or
continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.""
7
The Court responded, saying "[i]t is not an irrational or inconsistent
policy choice to permit prosecution of criminal offenses during the
pendency of a bankruptcy action and at the same time to preclude
probation officials from enforcing restitution orders while a debtor seeks
relief under Chapter 13. "118
Congress responded to the Davenport decision by amending the
Bankruptcy Code. l l9 Now the Chapter 13 of the Code includes a new
discharge exception for "any debt... for restitution included in a
sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime." 2 ' It is clear that
Congress has shut the door on dischargeability of criminal restitutionary
obligations; nevertheless, one circuit has held that criminal fines are
dischargeable in Chapter 13 bankruptcy.121
A key aspect of the Gruntz court's holding, that the automatic stay
did not prevent a debtor's criminal prosecution in state court, was the
court's reliance on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Kelly that the
Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted to "reflect... a deep conviction
that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state
criminal proceedings... [which entail] the [sovereign] right to formulate
and enforce penal sanctions ....,12s Yet, relying on this opinion alone
to support the general proposition that bankruptcy courts are completely
without power to invalidate the results of a criminal proceeding may be a
bit of a reach. A fairly recent article by Professor Zaretsky of the
Brooklyn Law School suggests why that might be so.1'3 In his article,
Professor Zaretsky compares Kelly and Davenport with the Sixth
Circuit's holding in Hardenberg v. Virginia 24 that a criminal fine imposed
against a debtor by a state criminal court may be discharged in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
25
Professor Zaretsky initially notes that "the intersection between
bankruptcy and criminal law generally revolves around noninterference
with criminal proceedings and with the enforcement of criminal fines,
penalties and restitutionary orders that require the payment of
117. Id. at 560 (quoting 11 U.S.CA §362(b)(1) (West 2001)).
118. Id. at 660-61.
119. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a)(3) (West 2001) (Code currently provides a discharge
exception for a criminal fine or restitution).
120. Id.
121. See In reHardenberg, 42 F.3d 986 (6th Cir. 1994).
122. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47.
123. Barry L. Zaretsky, Criminal Fines and Discharge of Debts, 213 N.Y. L.J. 3 (col. 1)
(Jan. 19, 1995).
124. 42 F.3d 986 (6th Cir. 1994).
125. Zaretsky, supra n. 123, at 3.
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money. " 12 6 According to Professor Zaretsky, however, that philosophy is
not always uniformly honored.127 He notes the opposite results in Kelly
and Davenport, but recognizes the post-Davenport amendment to
Chapter 13 excepting restitution obligations from discharge.
128
In his review of Hardenberg, Zaretsky discusses these seemingly
inconsistent interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code's dischargeability
provisions. 129  Hardenberg involved a debtor who was convicted and
fined for driving under the influence (DUI).13 0 After his conviction, the
debtor filed for Chapter 13 protection, listing the State as an unsecured
creditor. 13 ' According to the terms of the Chapter 13 plan, the State of
Virginia was to receive twenty percent payment on its unsecured
claim. 132  The debtor then applied to Virginia for a letter of
reinstatement. 33  When the state refused to reinstate the debtor's
driving privileges, the debtor brought an adversary proceeding against
the state. ' 3 4 The bankruptcy court held that, although the automatic
stay did not apply to Virginia's refusal to issue a reinstatement letter, the
fines were dischargeable debts. 35 The district court affirmed.1
3 6
In affirming the district and bankruptcy courts, the Sixth Circuit
held that since the revised language of Chapter 13 pertaining to
dischargeability of debts excludes only debts for restitution resulting
from a debtor's criminal conviction it reasoned that Congress must have
intended for criminal fines to be dischargeable as debts. 37 The court
reached this conclusion primarily because of its belief that "[where...
congressional intent is clear, [a court's] sole function is to enforce [a]
statute according to its terms." 3 8 In Zaretsky's opinion, Hardenberg,
"[als a matter of statutory interpretation, and as an application of
available precedent... clearly reaches the right result." 39 He notes that
as a matter of policy, it would not be unreasonable for the legislature to
have decided that if a debtor makes a good faith attempt to repay his...
debts under a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor can be discharged from some
criminal obligations.... In this regard, it also would not be unreasonable
to distinguish between those obligations the payment of which ultimately
126. Id.
127. See icL (discussing various results in recent cases involving criminal proceedings).
128. See I&.
129. Id.




134. Id. at 987-88.
135. Id. at 988.
136. Hardenberg, 42 F.3d at 988.
137. Id. at 993-94 (citing 11 U.S.CA. § 1328(a) (West 2001)).
138. Id. (quoting Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564).
139. Zaretsky, supra n. 123, at 3.
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benefit the victim (restitution) and those that flow only into the State's
140general coffers (fines) .
Zaretsky acknowledges that Congress may have unintentionally omitted
criminal fines from its post-Davenport amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code, but notes that the question remains open. 14 1 He concludes by
suggesting Congress can fix any seeming inconsistencies in the
Bankruptcy Code by amending it, and notes that "fiun light of the broad
definition of 'debt' and 'claim,' the Supreme Court's holdings in Kelly
and Davenport, the express exception to discharge limited to restitution
obligations in Chapter 13 and some justification for a distinction
between restitution and fines, it seems clear that non-restitution
criminal penalties must be 'debts' under the Bankruptcy Code that are
dischargeable in Chapter 13.
"142
Although Kelly, Davenport, and Hardenberg appear outwardly
inconsistent, 143 it is clear this is because each case relied on a different
section, or version of a section, of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the
holding in each case differed only because each of the courts construed
each statutory section according to its plain meaning. In the end, what
appears to be a chink in the iron-clad rule that bankruptcy courts
should not interfere with state criminal court judgments is really nothing
more than a mirage. While neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth
Circuit directly addressed the issue raised in Gruntz, other circuits have
consistently held that criminal proceedings, regardless of their
underlying purpose, are excepted from the automatic stay.1 44
The case most factually similar to Gruntz is In re Rollins.141 Like the
debtor in Gruntz, the debtor in Rollins owed monthly child support
payments that arose out of a divorce decree.1 4 6 Also, like the Gruntz
case, when the Rollins debtor failed to make the required payments, he
was tried for child abandonment and convicted.147 The state court in
Rollins conditionally suspended the debtor's sentence and ordered him
to pay a fine and to meet the support terms of the divorce decree.1
48
Unlike Gruntz, however, the debtor in Rollins did not file for Chapter 13
bankruptcy protection until after the revocation proceedings were
initiated. 49 Per the terms of his confirmed plan, the debtor in Rollins
140. Id.
141. See icL (reasoning that Congress may have included only restitution simply because
it was the only issue it was responding to after Davenport).
142. Id.
143. See supra nn. 115, 116, 135 and accompanying text.
144. See e.g. Campbell, 140 F.3d 1043; infra nn. 163-66 and accompanying text.
145. 243 B.R. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
146. Id. at 542.
147. Id. at 542-43.
148. Id. at 543.
149. Id. at 543-44.
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agreed to pay all the back child-support payments he owed.'150 When the
judge became aware of the debtor's bankruptcy petition, she postponed
action on the revocation request until the county could research whether
her court could proceed. The county ignored the judge and initiated a
second revocation request. The debtor responded by filing an adversary
proceeding alleging the county violated the automatic stay. It is
significant to note that the court never acted on the revocation request.
In contrast, the state court in Gruntz proceeded with sentencing despite
the debtor's adversary complaint.' 5'
In the adversary proceeding, the principle issue the bankruptcy
court considered was whether the county's attempts to revoke the
debtor's suspended sentence violated the automatic stay. 52  The
bankruptcy court said that it did violate the stay 53 holding that where a
state's child support and abandonment law has the welfare of the child
as its main aim, rather than punishment and deterrence, the state's
action revoking a debtor's suspended sentence after his subsequent
failure to meet the terms of the sentence for non-support resembles a
remedial measure in the nature of civil contempt. 1 4  Thus, it falls
outside the automatic stay exemption under section 362(b)(1) for the
commencement or continuation of criminal proceedings against the
debtor. 155
The district court, reversing the bankruptcy court's decision, first
examined the situations in which the automatic stay does apply. 56 It
then noted the exception under section 362(b)(1) for "the commencement
or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor."
57
Next, the court examined what the language in section 362(b)(1) meant,
noting that in interpreting provisions of the Bankruptcy Code "courts
must first look to the plain meaning of the words used, and then
determine whether applying the plain meaning is demonstrably at odds
with Congress' intent."158 Looking at the words themselves, the court
found that actions to revoke a debtor's probation did constitute "the
continuation of criminal actions" within the meaning of the statute.
59
Turning next to the Bankruptcy Code's legislative history, the court
found that it was consistent with the plain meaning of the section
150. Id at 542.
151. See supra nn. 43, 52 and accompanying text.
152. Rollins, 200 B.R. at 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).
153. Id. at 443.
154. Id. at 448.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 546.
157. Id. at 547 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(1) (West 2001)).
158. Rollins, 200 B.R. at 547 (citing Jove Engr., Inc. v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1550 (11th Cir.
1996)).
159. Id. at 547.
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362(b)(1) 160 noting that the "bankruptcy laws are not a haven for
criminal offenders... [and that] criminal actions and proceedings may
proceed in spite of bankruptcy." 161 Thus, the court held the county's
actions to have the debtor's probation revoked were excepted from the
reach of the automatic stay.
62
Although the court recognized that some courts do consider the
state's motivation in bringing or continuing a criminal action, 6 it noted
that most courts "have found such an inquiry inappropriate." 164 While
the court acknowledged that using criminal process to collect civil debts
.may frustrate the purpose of the automatic stay."165 It advised that
bankruptcy courts could use their section 105 powers to enjoin those
types of actions because "the section 362(b)(1) exception... merely
reflects Congressional judgment that debtors should move bankruptcy
courts to action to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a
particular action interferes with the debtor's financial rehabilitation or
the orderly liquidation of his estate.
" 166
In a somewhat older case, In re Sylvestre, 67 the Fourth Circuit
examined the issue of whether a store's action in swearing out a criminal
complaint against a debtor for bad checks constituted a violation of the
automatic stay.6 The debtor in Sylvestre owed a grocery store money
for passing bad checks at the time she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
protection. 69 The debtor informed the store of her bankruptcy status
only after they had pressed charges against her. 70  After she was
convicted for larceny, she appealed, and the matter was eventually
dismissed. 17 1 The debtor then filed contempt charges against the store
for violating the automatic stay.17 2  The store moved for summary
judgment which the bankruptcy court granted. 73 The district court
affirmed, and the debtor appealed. 7 4
In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit held the store's
actions in bringing criminal charges did not violate the automatic stay.
1 75
160. Id.
161. Id. at 546-47 (quoting H.R. Rpt. 95-595, at § 362 (Sept. 8. 1977); S. Rpt. 95-598, at §
361 (July 14, 1978) (reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5837, 6299)).
162. Id. at 547-48.
163. Id. at 548.
164. Rollins, 200 B.R. at 548.
165. Id. (quoting Howard v. AUard, 122 B.R. 696, 699 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1991)).
166. Id.
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According to the court, the situation fell into a exception under the
unambiguous language of section 362(b)(1). 176  The court noted that
"[nlearly every court that has examined the scope of § 362(b) has
concluded that 'criminal action' includes all criminal actions. " 177 The
court cited a Kentucky case which held that criminal proceedings whose
purpose is debt collection were within the automatic stay's reach, but
disagreed with that court's reasoning in part because section 105's
injunctive powers provide a remedy for those situations. 17 8 Sylvestre,
like Rollins is consistent with Gruntz. 1
79
The Fifth Circuit's position on the applicability of the automatic
stay to criminal debt collection-type actions is also consistent with
Gruntz. 8  In United States v. Caddell,'8' the Fifth Circuit examined
section 362(b)(1) in the context of a federal criminal probation revocation
action.182 The debtor in Caddell sold cattle that were mortgaged to the
Farmer's Home Administration (FHA) without the FHA's permission and
was subsequently convicted of fraudulent conversion. 18 3  Prior to
sentencing, the debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.'14 He was then
sentenced to probation on condition he make restitution to the FHA.185
When the debtor failed to meet his restitutionary obligations, his
probation officer initiated probation revocation proceedings, which
earned the debtor a prison sentence. 8 6 The debtor appealed the district
court's revocation order on the grounds that it violated the automatic
stay. 187
The Fifth Circuit held that the automatic stay does not bar "the
commencement or continuation of criminal proceedings" even where
restitution is involved as a condition of probation.188 The court also held
that the Supreme Court's holding in Kelly applied equally to criminal
actions brought against a debtor in either federal or state court. 189
While the Ninth, 190 Eleventh, 191 Fourth, 19 2 and Fifth Circuits 193 all
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (discussing In re Padgett, 37 B.R. 280, 284-85 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983)).
179. See supra nn. 88, 175 and accompanying text.
180. See infra n. 188 and accompanying text.
181. 830 F.2d 36 (1987).
182. Id. at 37.
183. Id. at 37-38.
184. Id. at 39.
185. Id. at 38.
186. Id.
187. CaddelL 830 F.2d at38.
188. Id. at 39 (citing Kelly, 479 U.S. 36 (1986)).
189. Id.
190. See Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1085 (holding the stay applies to criminal proceedings with
the intent to collect a debt).
191. For a recent decision by a court within the Eleventh Circuit, see Bryan v. Rainwater,
254 B.R. 273 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2000) (state court probation revocation action against a
Chapter 13 debtor who failed to make restitution payments after her conviction for
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appear to be in agreement, many jurisdictions still employ the approach
favored by the Hucke court. Considering the Supreme Court's
preferred plain meaning approach and the prevailing trend towards a
literal interpretation of section 362(b)(1), it is unlikely these holdings will
survive if appealed. The Gruntz opinion is reasonable with respect to
this portion of its holding, but there may be some problems with the
court's jurisdictional holding.
B. Potential Problems with the Jurisdictional Arm of Gruntz
Although Gruntz appears well reasoned, there are aspects of the
opinion that deserve a closer look, particularly the court's holding on
jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the automatic stay. An
examination of Gruntz' jurisdictional arm exposes three possible
interpretations of the court's holding: 1) the court simply ignored
existing precedent by barring state courts from making the applicability
determination, 2) the court rendered an ambiguous and legally
untenable holding 195 or 3) the court fully considered existing precedent,
but carefully delimited the scope of state court jurisdiction. The
interplay between key jurisdictional statutes, the strong current of case
law, and the language of the opinion itself, favor a reading of Gruntz that
is consistent with the third interpretation. Furthermore, the third
interpretation accords with common sense.
1. Statutory Sources of Jurisdiction Over the Stay's Reach and a
Survey of Recent Cases
Section 1334(a) of the Judiciary Act gives district courts "original
and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11" subject to certain
restrictions. 96 However, section 157 provides a mechanism whereby
district courts may refer bankruptcy cases and related proceedings to
bankruptcy judges.19 7  Section 157(b)(1) gives bankruptcy courts
embezzling money from her employer, did not violate the automatic stay).
192. See supra nn. 167-79 and accompanying text.
193. Cadde, 830 F.2d at 38.
194. See e.g. supra n. 178 (discussing Padget 37 B.R. at 283-84); In re Brown, 213 B.R.
317, 320-21 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1997).
195. This is the position stated in In re Lenke, 249 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000). See infra
Section III.B.2. for further discussion.
196. 28 U.S.CA. § 1334(a) (West 2001). Section 1334(b), however, states:
"Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or
courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related
to cases under title 11."
197. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(a) (West 2001) (stating specifically, that: "Each district court
may provide that any or all cases under Title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under
title 11 or arising in or related to a case under Title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy
judges for the district."). As noted in Gruntz, district courts automatically refer all
bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy courts. See supra n. 62.
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authority to "hear and determine all cases... and... core proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11. " 198 Subsection
(b)(2) gives some examples of core proceedings including "motions to
terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay."199
A significant number of circuits and lower courts have recognized
that deternining the applicability of the automatic stay is not a core
matter, and that, in addition to bankruptcy courts, other courts have
jurisdiction to make this determination. 20 0 The majority of these courts
follow the Second Circuit's declaration in In re Baldwin-United
Corporation Litigation,2°' that "[tlhe court in which the litigation claimed
to be stayed is pending has jurisdiction to determine... whether the
proceeding pending before it is subject to the automatic stay."20 2
Baldwin involved an insurance company embroiled in multi-district
litigation over Single Premium Deferred Annuities ("SPDAs") it issued.20 3
Due to uncertainties about the insurance company's ability to pay the
returns on the SPDAs, it was forced into Chapter 11 reorganization
proceedings in Ohio.2°  Shortly after filing for Chapter 11, one of the
insurance company's customers filed a third party complaint in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking indemnity
and contribution for the customer's liability in the multi-district
litigation.205 Believing the third party complaint violated the automatic
stay, the insurance company sought to have the Ohio bankruptcy court
determine the applicability of the stay.20 6 Before it was able to act,
however, the customer prevailed on the district court in New York to
determine the reach of the stay, and to enjoin the insurance company
from asking the bankruptcy court to determine if the stay applied.
207
After reviewing the facts, the Baldwin court concluded that
although the district court had jurisdiction to determine the automatic
stay's reach, it misused its equitable power when it issued the injunction
198. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(1) (West 2001).
199. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(G) (West 2001).
200. See e.g. In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding
that court hearing litigation where stay is pending has jurisdiction).
201. Id.; see Brock v. Morysville Body Works, Inc., 829 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1987)
(quoting Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d at 347 and holding that circuit courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the automatic stay). Cf. NLRB. v.
Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Baldwin-United Corp.
Litig., 765 F.2d at 347 and holding that the Sixth Circuit had jurisdiction to determine
whether the automatic stay reached an unfair labor practices proceeding).
202. Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d at 347. Although the court's holding applied to
whether a U.S. district court had authority to determine the stay's applicability, it has been
used to support the proposition that state courts also have concurrent jurisdiction over
determining the applicability of the automatic stay. Id.
203. Id. at 345.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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preventing the insurance company from asking the bankruptcy court to
determine the applicability of the stay.2 °8 The court gave two reasons
why the injunction was improper.20 9 First, it prevented the insurance
company from invoking the bankruptcy court's section 105 injunctive
powers. 210 According to the court, "to whatever extent a conflict may
arise between the authority of the Bankruptcy Court to administer this
complex reorganization and the authority of the District Court to
administer consolidated pretrial proceedings, the equities favor
maintenance of the unfettered authority of the Bankruptcy Court."2 x1
The second reason the injunction was improper was that it prevented
the insurance company from seeking the bankruptcy court's
determination of the automatic stay.212 The court also noted that the
equities favored allowing the bankruptcy court, over the district court, to
determine the applicability of the stay.213 Noting the potential pitfalls
with respect to a bankrupt's participation in multi-district litigation, the
court warned, "[i]f the applicability of the stay... is determined in
various district courts throughout the country, the ability of the
Bankruptcy Court to assure equality of treatment among creditors will
be seriously threatened."21 4 The best solution, the court advised, is to
"centraliz[e] construction of the automatic stay in the Bankruptcy
Court .... 215
Baldwin is a difficult case to understand because it seems to send
mixed messages. Namely, while holding it is generally permissible for a
district court to determine the applicability of the automatic stay,
Baldwin also seems to suggest that certain circumstances may warrant
deferring the issue to the bankruptcy court to make that
determination. 21 6 The Ninth Circuit, in Gruntz, chose to ignore Baldwin,
partly because it characterized the Baldwin court's comments on
automatic stay jurisdictional issues as dicta. Additionally, the Gruntz
court distinguished that case from Baldwin, since the Gruntz case
concerned a federal district-rather than state-court's power to
determine the reach of the automatic stay.21 7 Whatever the case, other
courts have used Baldwin to support the proposition that state courts do
208. Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d at 349.
209. See id. at 347 (noting that the injunction "improperly interferes with the





214. Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d at 349.
215. Id.
216. See supra n. 215 and accompanying text.
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218have jurisdiction to determine the stay's applicability. In two cases
decided in 1999, In re Glass21 9 and In re Greene,220 the courts reached
that conclusion on facts somewhat similar to Gruntz.
221
In Glass the debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection after
a state court ordered him to pay his wife $1,500 per month until full
satisfaction of a lump sum alimony payment resulting from the couple's
divorce decree. 2 2 2 When he failed to make one of his required monthly
alimony payments, the debtor's wife and her lawyers filed a contempt
citation in state court.2 2 3 The state court determined that the alimony
payments were exempt from the automatic stay, and held the debtor in
contempt.224 The debtor alleged the state court's actions violated the
automatic stay, and asked the bankruptcy court to award sanctions. 5
The bankruptcy court in Glass held that the state court, in
determining that the alimony payments were excluded from the
automatic stay, acted within its jurisdiction.226  In arriving at its
conclusion, the court examined the Ninth Circuit's Panel Decision in
227Gruntz. The court took issue with the Gruntz Panel's holding that
"state court jurisdiction to determine [the automatic stay's] scope 'would
be inconsistent with and subvert the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts.'" 228 The court noted that interpreting the scope of the automatic
stay "is not so closely linked to the bankruptcy court's exclusive
jurisdiction over the case itself."229  The court then explained that
"because a proceeding to determine the applicability of the automatic
stay does not constitute a bankruptcy case, the exclusivity of jurisdiction
218. See e.g. infra n. 221 and accompanying text.
219. 240 B.R. 782 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
220. 1999 WL 689711 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1999).
221. See Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1077 (debtor owed money for child support). The court in
another case recognized the well-settled principle that "bankruptcy courts do not have
exclusive jurisdiction in determining the applicability of the automatic stay." In re Watson,
192 B.R. 739, 746 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (citing Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d at
347). The court also held that a state court had the authority to determine the
applicability of a discharge injunction, because the discharge injunction "replaces the
automatic stay after discharge is entered." Id. (citing In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 885 F.2d
621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989)); In re Con. of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant
Church, 184 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. Del. 1995). The court in that case relied on Baldwin and
others to support its conclusion that "[s]ince a non-bankruptcy court has the right to
consider whether the automatic stay order applies to matters before it, it logically follows
that the parties before that court have the right... to express to that court their views on
whether the stay order applies to such matters." Id. at 216 (citing Baldwin-United Corp.
Litig., 765 F.2d at 347).
222. Glass, 240 B.R. at 783.
223. Id. at 784.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 788.
227. Id. at 787 (citing Gruntz, 166 F.3d 1020).
228. Glass, 240 B.R. at 787 (citing Gruntz, 166 F.3d at 1024).
229. Id. at 787 n. 4.
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provision of [section] 1334(a) does not apply."2 0 Next, the court accused
the Ninth Circuit Panel of failing to recognize that section 1334(b) grants
bankruptcy courts only original, not exclusive, jurisdiction to determine
the applicability of the stayY' Ultimately, the court dismissed the
Gruntz Panel Decision in favor of the holdings in Baldwin and other
cases by concluding "the applicability of the automatic stay falls
concurrently within the purview of the bankruptcy court and that of the
state court."2 2  However, the court cautioned that determining the
applicability of the stay and granting relief from the stay's provisions are
separate and distinct notions.
In Greene the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
considered the propriety of a bankruptcy court's decision to abstain from
hearing a debtor's complaint which alleged, among other things, that a
state court violated the automatic stay by ordering the debtor to pay
child support.2"4 The Chapter 7 debtor's complaint alleged mainly
violations of state law, but also included an allegation that the state
court, in declaring him the presumptive father of his wife's child, and
ordering him to provide support, violated the automatic stay.235  In
addition, the complaint asked the bankruptcy court to determine the
dischargeability of the support obligation.2 6 The bankruptcy court in
Greene refused to hear the debtor's case on permissive abstention
grounds and dismissed it.2 7 The debtor appealed.28
In affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court noted that the
bankruptcy court has discretion to abstain from hearing the case
depending on the balance of certain factors where the only core
bankruptcy issues are "inextricably intertwined with the predominant
claim of the Plaintiff."2 9 After assessing the relevant factors the court
concluded that the bankruptcy court correctly abstained from hearing
the debtor's case, agreeing with the bankruptcy court that the debtor's
complaint had "an element of forum shopping."
240
Next, the court addressed whether the bankruptcy court was
correct in holding that the state court had concurrent jurisdiction to
determine the applicability of the automatic stay.24 1 The district court
agreed with the bankruptcy court that "although the state court did not
230. I& at 787.
231. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West 2001)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 787 n. 5.





239. Id. at *2 (quoting Greene, 1999 WL 138905 at *4.
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have jurisdiction to grant relief from the automatic stay, it had
concurrent jurisdiction with the bankruptcy court to determine the
scope of the stay."
242
Baldwin, Glass, Greene, and the litany of other cases that reach the
same result clearly indicate that jurisdiction to determine the
applicability of the automatic stay rests concurrently with bankruptcy
courts and other courts that are asked to rule on the stay's reach in the
course of pending litigation.243 The number and consistency of these
opinions suggest that Gruntz is out of sync with most jurisdictions on
this issue. Recent criticism of the opinion itself suggests there may be
other problems with Gruntz jurisdictional holding as well.
2. Recent Criticism From Within the Ninth Circuit
In In re Lenke v. Ttshler,2 4 a bankruptcy court criticized the Ninth
Circuit's holding that federal, rather than state, courts have the power to
modify the automatic stay.245 Referring to the decision as "troubled and
troubling," the Lenke court attacked the Ninth Circuit's holding as being
unclear and open to several interpretations.246
In Lenke, the debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
(later converted to Chapter 7) after he was indicted for embezzling
$30,000 from a former business in which he was a partner.247 His listed
debts, which included the $30,000 allegedly stolen from the business,
were discharged just before his criminal trial began.248 At the same time
the debtor also notified the criminal court of his bankruptcy, and
"asserted that the criminal trial would violate his discharge injunction
because it was a disguised effort to collect a discharged debt."2 49 When
the court told him the criminal trial would proceed unless he got an
injunction from the bankruptcy court, the debtor filed an adversary
complaint seeking injunctive relief against the state criminal
prosecution.25 °
The principle issue in Lenke was "whether a bankruptcy court may
enjoin a criminal prosecution that allegedly violate[d] the discharge
injunction because it [was] intended as a debt collection. " 251 However,
242. Id. (citing Greene, 1999 WL 138905 at *7-*9). The court also cited to Brock 829 F.2d
at 387. The Brock opinion cited Baldwin in support of the proposition that bankruptcy
courts share jurisdiction over determining the reach of the automatic stay with other
courts. See supra n. 201.
243. Supra nn. 215, 232, 242 and accompanying text.
244. 249 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000).
245. Id. at 5-6.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 3.
248. Id. at 2.
249. Id.
250. Lenke, 249 B.R. at 3.
251. Id. at 7.
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the court also addressed the related issue of whether a state has the
power to construe the provisions of the automatic stay.2 52 In resolving
this second issue the court revealed the critical problem with the Gruntz
holding: that the Ninth Circuit never clearly determined whether states
have the power to interpret the automatic stay.2 53 As evidence of this
open question, the Lenke court pointed to the fact that the Ninth Circuit
en banc opinion reframed the issue stated by the panel decisions.25 4 As
a result, the court considered and decided only the specific issue of
whether states have the power to modify the automatic stay.255 This
mischaracterization, according to the Lenke court, left open four possible
readings of the Gruntz holding.25 6
Before deciding which of the four readings was right, the Lenke
court limited the Gruntz holding that the automatic stay does not reach
state court criminal prosecutions brought against a debtor.25 First, the
court pointed to section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 which allows the
bankruptcy court to enjoin state proceedings "that are not subject to the
automatic stay but that threaten the bankruptcy estate."259 The court
then added that injunctive powers are "not limited by the delineated
exceptions to the automatic stay, nor confined to civil proceedings."2 60
Next, the court reinforced the importance of the bankruptcy court's
injunctive power in maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of
bankruptcy law, a policy which "requires bankruptcy courts to retain the
power to uphold the discharge should a state attempt to use its criminal
252. Id.
253. Id. at 6.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 8.
256. Lenke, 249 B.R. at 6-7. According to the court, the possibilities are as follows:
1. The state court should proceed with the prosecution.., without asking
whether it is stayed, because state courts lack jurisdiction to determine the scope
of the automatic stay.
2. The state court should await a bankruptcy court's determination that the
criminal prosecution is stayed, because only bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction
to make that determination ....
3. The state court should determine, based on § 362(b)(1) and the holding of
Grntz, that criminal prosecutions are not stayed, and therefore proceed with the
prosecution, because under the first holding of Gruntz, based on how the Ninth
Circuit stated the issue, state courts lack jurisdiction only to modify an automatic
stay, not jurisdiction to determine its applicability.
4. The state court should determine the applicability of the automatic stay
because it is not bound by the rulings of any federal court except the U.S.
Supreme Court ... and state courts have their own precedents to follow
construing the automatic stay.
Id. at 7.
257. See id. at 7 (noting that the Gruntz opinion does not mean all criminal actions are
allowed during bankruptcy).
258. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West 2001).
259. Lenke, 249 B.R. at 7 (quoting Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1086).
260. Id. (quoting Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1086).
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processes to collect a discharged debt. "261 Then the court made a
puzzling argument: injunctive relief should "remain available in
bankruptcy courts because if the [Gruntz] jurisdictional holding is read
broadly, then state courts would lack jurisdiction to determine, at least
conclusively, the more difficult issues of whether... a restitution order
constitutes a debt that has been or can be discharged." 262 The court
followed this statement by holding that the Gruntz jurisdictional holding
applied to dischargeability of debts as well as to the automatic stay
because discharge determinations are also core proceedings. 26 The
court then argued that the Gruntz holding should be read narrowly in
light of existing precedent that has allowed state courts to rule on
dischargeability of debts when raised as a defense. 264 In support of
allowing state courts to determine dischargeability of debts, the court
quoted Davenpot265 for the proposition that past bankruptcy precedent
should be left alone unless Congress intends otherwise.266 The court
then announced that there was no such congressional intent in any of
the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or in Title 28.267
The court ultimately concluded that the narrow interpretation it
proposed in option three2m was "the most felicitous to the language of
the [Gruntz] opinion and the history of bankruptcy law."269 The court
noted,
Because it would be such a radical departure from accepted law to deprive
state courts of jurisdiction to determine whether a debt has been
discharged, it makes better sense to read [Gruntz] as similarly not
depriving state courts of jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the
automatic stay in the first instance, but only as denying them jurisdiction
to modify the stay.
Having decided the jurisdictional issue, the court turned to whether
bankruptcy courts should be bound by state court determinations of the
applicability of the automatic stay or discharge of debts. 27 1 The court
261. Id at8.
262. Id. If state courts cannot interpret the discharge status of a debt, which is the result
under a broad reading of Gruntz, then it is strange to argue this as a justification for
section 105 injunctive powers remaining available in the bankruptcy courts. See Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934); W.M. Moore, Collier on
Bankruptcy vol. 1A, T 17.28, 1739 (14th ed., Matthew Bender 1978)). A narrow reading of
the Gruntz jurisdictional holding would allow state courts to determine the applicability of
the automatic stay, and by extension, whether a debt has been discharged or not.
265. 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
266. Lenke, 249 B.R. at 9 (quoting Davenport, 495 U.S. at 563).
267. Id. (quoting from the relevant Code provisions).
268. See supra n. 257. Option three refers to having the state court use section 362 and
the Gruntz holding to determine that criminal prosecutions are not stayed and then
.proceed with prosecution." Id. at 7.
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noted two possible answers within the Gruntz opinion.
2 2
The court then noted an authoritative case on the issue, In re
Pavelich v. McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP.27 3 The
Lenke court suggested the case stands for the proposition that once a
state court has made a factual determination as to discharge or the
automatic stay, that determination precludes the bankruptcy court from
redeciding the same issue.2 7 4 Since the facts in Lenke showed that the
debtor asked the bankruptcy court to enjoin the state trial before it
began, the court argued that issue preclusion was not a problem and
that Gruntz supported its authority to "determine whether a criminal
prosecution violates a discharge and, if so, to enjoin it under [section]
105. 275
In the end, Lenke may prove tougher to divide or apply than the
Gruntz case it criticized for being "troubled and troubling. 276 Although
Lenke raised some important questions, it remains to be seen whether
Gruntz prevents a state from simply determining if the automatic stay
applies. A closer look at Gruntz reveals the probable answer.
3. What Gruntz Really Says about Jurisdiction to Determine the
Reach of the Stay
Gruntz, even though ripe with ambiguity, should be read as denying
state courts jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the automatic
stay. This is true for three reasons. First, the court chose to frame the
issue as "whether a state court modification of the bankruptcy automatic
stay binds federal courts."27 7 Recall that, under section 157(b)(2)(G),
"motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay" are core
proceedings within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.278
By using the word "modification" in lieu of the phrase "determination of
the applicability of," the court avoided the issue of whether the state
court's action was a core proceeding.2 7 9 Because modifications of the
automatic stay do constitute core proceedings, the court was free to say
that the state court was prohibited from acting in this regard.
272. Id. The court suggested Gruntz could be read two ways: 1) that bankruptcy courts
have primacy in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, thus state court determinations that
might interfere with the bankruptcy court's plenary authority would be invalid; and 2) a
state court acting when a stay has been lifted is the same as the state court acting as if the
stay never applied at all, so if the former is entitled to "full faith and credit" (including issue
preclusion and Rooker-Feldman) then so should the latter. Id. at 10 (citing Gruntz, 202
F.3d at 1084).
273. 229 B.R. 777 (B-.AP. 9th Cir. 1999).
274. Lenke, 249 B.R. at 10-11 (citing Pavelich v. McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte &
Carmth LLP, 229 B.R. at 783-84).
275. Id. at 11.
276. Id. at 5.
277. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1077.
278. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(G) (West 2001).
279. Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1077.
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The second reason Grntz supports jurisdiction over the
applicability of the stay resting solely with bankruptcy courts is that the
court chose not to adopt the holding in Baldwin.280 By refusing to
281extend Baldwin's holding to state courts, the Ninth Circuit implicitly
suggested that state courts lack jurisdiction to determine the
applicability of the automatic stay.
The third and most convincing reason that Gruntz denies state
courts jurisdiction to determine the reach of the stay is the presence of
express language in the opinion. The court clearly stated that "the final
decision concerning the applicability of the automatic stay must rest
with the federal courts."28 2 The court also noted that "[blecause of the
bankruptcy court's plenary power over core proceedings, the County's
argument that states have concurrent jurisdiction over the automatic
stay ... is unavailing.283
IV. CONCLUSION
Should Gruntz, or a case which raises similar issues, reach the
Supreme Court, the Court will most likely affirm the holding that
criminal prosecutions, or actions continuing them, against the debtor
are beyond the reach of the automatic stay. The plain meaning standard
for interpreting Bankruptcy Code provisions, and the fact that the tide is
turning toward a more narrow view of section 362(b)(1) both support this
assertion. As to the jurisdictional holding, the Court will either 1) side
with the Gruntz court and clarify the opinion to include not just
modifications of the automatic stay, but state court applicability
determinations as well, or 2) allow states to conditionally determine the
applicability of the automatic stay. The second alternative comports
with common sense. If the state court determines that the stay does
apply, it would delay proceedings against the debtor until the stay lifted.
In this scenario there would be no harm done if the state's determination
proved to be wrong. On the other hand, if the state court incorrectly
concludes that the stay does not apply and proceeds against the debtor,
any judgment it renders against the debtor would be declared void. A
more practical approach says that whichever sovereign ultimately
decides the issue is irrelevant anyway, since 362(b)(1) appears air-tight.
Bankruptcy courts remain the center of the bankruptcy universe.
However, given the limits of the automatic stay with respect to state
criminal proceedings against the debtor, and the prevailing opinion that
280. See id. at 1083 (holding that the federal courts have the final determination of the
applicability of the stay); id. at 1083 n. 7 (discussing that "the County's reliance on dicta"
in Baldwin was incorrect).
281. See id.
282. Id. at 1084.
283. Id. at 1082-83.
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state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over automatic stay
applicability determinations, it is clear that bankruptcy courts are not
the sole center of this universe. Thus, Foucault's pendulum is alone and
absolute as it ceaselessly swings: "given momentum by the instability of
the solid floor beneath it."2
Alex Hart
284. Sauer, supra n. 1.
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